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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SECURITIES CREDIT CORPORA-
TION, A CORPORATION, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
MARION WILLEY, dba ~fARION 
WILLEY & SONS, 
RespMtdent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8041 
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts of 
the appellant as set forth in appellant's brief so far as 
the facts are stated. 
However, respondent denies the conclusions inserted 
by the appellant in its Statement of Facts. On page three 
of Appellant's brief, the appellant in the next to the last 
paragraph sets forth: 
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"Paragraph 3 of the Counterclaim alleges 
that the sale of the automobile by Barrett to the 
Respondent was with full knowledge and consent 
of the Respondent." 
rrhere appears to be a mistake in the last word of the 
paragraph which should have read "Appellant", not "Re-
~pondent'' 
The additional facts to be stated are in the main con-
tained in the Respondent's lterrogatories served upon 
the Appellant, (R. 20) and the Answers To Interroga-
tories To Plaintiff (R. 22) made by the appellant: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1 
1. In paragraph 1 of the complaint the plaintiff al-
leges it is the owner of the subject automobile and en-
titled to possession of same. (a) From whom was the 
automobile purchased 
ANSWER: The Plaintiff received an assignment of the 
contract of sale from the Motor Center of Pocatello, 
Inc., of Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho. 
(b) When and where was it purchased. 
ANSWER: The contract for the sale of said car was 
purchased on the 9th day of September, 1952 at Pocatello, 
Idaho. 
(c) Was ti tie issued in name of plain tiff. 
ANSWER: Title was issued showing plaintiff as lien-
holder by virtue of conditional sales contract, which had 
been assigned to plaintiff. 
(d) When did plaintiff get possession of same. 
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ANSWER: Plaintiff did not take possession of said car. 
(e) When did plaintiff part with possession of 
sa1ne 
.A.NS,VER: (No answer given) 
(f) To whom was possession relinquished by plain-
tiff . 
. A ..NSvVER: (No answer given) 
(g) How much did plaintiff pay for said autonlo-
bile, to \vhom, and when . 
. A .. NS\Y.ER: The plaintiff paid $2439.51 to Motor Center 
of Pocatello Inc. upon the 9th day of S.eptember, 1952. 
(h) Describe the document by "\vhich plaintiff clain1s 
title 
ANSWER: Certificate of title of motor vehicle issued 
by the Department of Law Enforcement, No. 818165, and 
conditional sales contract assigned to p-laintiff. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2 
Does the plaintiff have a certificate of title to said 
vehicle. If so, when and where was the same issued and 
by whom. 
ANSWER: Yes, the same was issued September 16, 
1952, at Boise, Idaho, by the Department of Law Enforce-
ment, 
INTERRO·GATORY NO.3 
Is plaintiff acquainted with Edwin S. Barrett or Edw. 
S. Barrett of Pocatello, Idaho. If so, has plaintiff had 
any business transactions with hin1 during the past two 
years 
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ANSWER: Yes, plaintiff has had business transactions 
with Edward S. Barrett of Pocatello, Idaho, during the 
past two years. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4 
State the nature of business done with Edw. S. 
Barrett during the past two years. 
ANSWER: The nature of the business done with Ed-
ward S. Barrett was financing motor vehicles. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5 
Has plaintiff done any business with Motor c·enter of 
Pocatello, Inc., during the past two years. If so, state 
the nature of the business. 
ANSWER: Yes, the plaintiff has done business with 
Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., during the past two 
years. The nature of the business has been the financing 
the sale of automobiles, flooring automobiles and various 
types of financing. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6 
Has plaintiff financed any automobiles for Edw. S. 
Barrett and/or Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., during 
the past two years. 
ANSWER: Yes. 
IN·TERROGATORY NO. 7 
List the date, amounts advanced, and the descrip-
tion of any automobiles finaced by plaintiff for Edw. S. 
Barrett and/or Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., during 
t~e past two years. 
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ANSWER: A full and complete answer to this inter-
rogatory would require a complete audit of the Edward 
S. Barrett and Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc. accounts 
extending over the full period of two years and would be 
burdensome upon the plaintiff. Innumerable transactions 
have occurred during the last two years and the ferreting 
out of each one would an1ount to a Herculean task. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8 
What if any docwnents were executed at the time of 
the alleged purchase of the subject automobile. Were any 
of these documents recorded; if so, when and where. 
ANSWER: Assignment of conditional sales contract; 
execution of certificate of title by the Department of Law 
Enforcement; application for transfer of title made by 
Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., to cause title to be issued 
in name of the plaintiff. The assignment of contract was 
recorded in the office of the Department of Law Enforce-
ment, Boise, Idaho. Application for certificate of title in 
name of plaintiff was filed with the department of La'v 
Enforcement. Copy of the conditional sales contract was 
filed with the Department of Law Enforcement. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9 
State the name and address of any persons who pur-
chased any automobiles from Edw. S. Barrett and/or 
Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., which had been financed 
by you during the past two years. 
ANSWER: (Same as No.7) 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 10 
Does Edw. S. Barrett and/or Motor Center of Poca-
tello, Inc., owe you any money. If so, state how much~ 
the dates the obligations were incurred, and the amounts 
which have been paid on the obligations since September 
15, 1952 . 
. AN~ \VER: rrhe exact amount of debt is not now known 
to the plaintiff. The nature of said indebtedness is con-
ditioned and conditional upon plaintiff's fully collecting 
t·ontraets which have been assigned to plaintiff. One debt 
of $528.00 is liquidated. This debt was incurred July 17, 
l!J55. No payments have been made upon the liquidated 
debt and no definite amount has been estimated on the 
conditional debts. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11 
Has any action been commenced by plaintiff against 
Edw. S. Barrett andjor Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., 
within the past four months. If so, describe the action 
taken, the purpose thereof, and the present status there-
of. 
ANSWER: No. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12 
State the names and address of any witnesses to 
matter~ alleged in the complaint. 
ANSWER: Edward S. Barrett, John Rademacher, 
Charles E. Crawshaw, Evan F. Olson, all residents of 
Pocatello, Bannock County, State of Idaho. 
The Respondent alleged by way of counterclaim (R. 
3) : 
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"1. On or about the 15th· day of September, 
1952, defendant purchased a new 1952 model Mer-
cury automobile, four-door sedan, Motor No. 52 
LA 27, 188M, from one Ed Barrett doing business 
as Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., at 628 North 
Main Street, Pocatello, Idaho, as an authorized 
dealer in new Mercury Automobiles, for a total 
sum of $2650.00 fully paid by Defendant to said 
seller. 
2. No certificate of title was delivered to de-
fendant upon delivery of said automobile by the 
said seller for the reason advanced by the seller 
that none had been issued. Defendant has since 
January, 1951, purchased some fifteen new Mer-
cury automobiles from said Ed Barrett and Motor 
Center of Pocatello, Inc., and each of said vehicles 
was delivered to defendant without certificates of 
title but the defendant obtained certificates of 
title upon said new automobiles in the State of 
Utah. Defendant had no notice of any _claim of 
the Plaintiff whatsoever until more than one 
month after said purchase was completed. 
3. The sale of the said automobile by said 
seller to defendant was with the full knowledge 
and consent of the plaintiff. 
4. By provisions of the laws of the State of 
Idaho, and the State of Utah, the Plaintiff has no 
right, title or interest in or to said automobile 
or any claim against the defendant. 
5. The defendant is entitled to a decree of 
this court quieting title to said automobile in de-
fendant and declaring that plaintiff has no right, 
title, interest or clain1 therein. 
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WHEREF'ORE defendant prays that the 
(~otnplaint be held for naught and that judgtnent 
he rendered quieting title to said automobile in the 
. . " defendant, and for the defendants costs. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
There are two principal ~~uestions for decision: 
POlX'T I 
WHETHER FROM THE PLEADINGS THE RESPOND-
ENT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE 
.\PPELLANT'S COMPLAINT. 
POIXT II 
WHETHER FROM THE PLEADINGS THE RESPOND-
ENT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT UPON THE 
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE RESPONDENT . 
. A.RG L":.\IENT 
POINT I 
WHETIIER FROM THE PLEADINGS THE RESPO:ND-
:SNT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE 
i\.PPELL.A.NT'S COMPLAINT. 
A determination should be made at the ou.tset as to . 
\vhat are pleadings for the purpose of a }fotion F·or 
~T udgment On the Pleadings, and particularly "\vhether 
answers to Interrogatories are pleadings. Rule 7 (a) of 
TJtah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
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... 7(a). PLEADINGS. There shall be a coin-
plaint and an answer; and there shall be a reply 
to a counterclaiin denoininated as such; an answer 
to a cross-claiin, if the ans,ver contains a cross-
claim: a third party con1plaint, if leave is given 
under Rule 14 to sutnmon a person 'vho was not 
an original party; and there shall be a third 
party answer, if a third party complaint is served. 
No other pleading shall be allowed, except that 
the court may order a reply to an answer or a 
third party answer." 
There is no mention that Interrogatories To Parties 
or the answers thereto are pleadings. It is the contention 
of the Respondent that Answers To Interrogatories are 
pleadings whenever the Answer to Interrogatories 
relates to an issue raised by the allegations of a com-
plaint, answer or counterclaim. In support of the con-
tention that answers to Interrogatories are pleadings, 
Respondent refers by analogy to the use, function and 
designation of a Bill of Particulars under the former 
Code of Civil Procedure. The Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, 104-6-3, provides: 
104-6-3. ENUMERATED. "The only plead-
ings allowed on the part of the plaintiff are: 
(1) The complaint. 
(2) The demurrer to the answer. 
(3) The reply. 
And on the part of the defendant: 
(1) The demurrer to the complaint. 
(2) The answer. 
(3) The demurrer to the reply." 
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No mention is made of a Bill of Particulars as being a 
pleading. 
Utah Code Annotated 1943 104-13-3 provides: 
' ' 
104-13-3. "AN ACCOUNT, HOW PLEADED 
-BILL OF PARTICULARS. It is not necessary 
for a party to set forth in a pleading the items of 
an account therein alleged, but he must deliver to 
the adverse party, within ten days after a demand 
therefor in writing, a copy of the account, or be 
precluded from giving evidence thereof. The 
court, or a judge thereof, rnay order a further 
account when the one delivered is to too general 
or is defective in any particular." 
.A. Bill of Particulars \\~as so held to be a pleading by 
the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Inland Engi-
neering & Construction Compa'ni!J vs. Maryland Casualty 
Comapny, et al., 76 U 435, 290 P 367, decided July 21, 
1930, wherein the Inland Engineering brought suit 
against a subcontractor and the surety for the sub-
contractor for an alleged failure to complete construction 
of a road as per contract. The Defendants demanded a 
bill of particulars, and the trial court ordered the Plain-
tiff to supply a bill of particulars, but none was in fact 
filed by the Plaintiff. Judgment in the lower court was 
for Plaintiff, but reversed and remanded by the Supreme 
Court because Plaintiff failed to file the bill of particu-
lars. 
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The Supren1e Court rnade, these pertjnent state-
tnents at page 447: 
.. The Statute relating to a Bill of Particulars 
is largely a rule of pleading relieving a pleader 
from the necessity of pleading each item unless 
required by the adverse party upon demand for 
a more particular and complete statement.'' 
At page 447 quoting fron1 1J!I or·ri.sette, Execu.tor vs 
TV ood, 1:2S Ala. 505, 30 So. 630, 631 : 
'~The word 'account' has no clearly-defined 
meanrng. 
"A bill of particulars has been held proper in 
actions based upon common counts .... libel and 
slander; ejectment; trover, trespass .... " 
At page 451: 
"Whenever a den1and for bill of particulars 
relates to an issue raised by allegations of a com-
plaint, an answer or a counterclaim, its proper 
classification must be a pleading, which should be 
filed as ordered b.y the court in this case, and the 
issues cannot be ·said to be made up or the case 
be at issue until such has been done." 
HHow can a court rule upon the admissibility 
of evidence relating to matters set out in a bill 
of particulars unless a bill is filed and is before 
the court as a part of the pleadings limiting and 
defining the issues. The authorities seem to be 
well nigh unanllnous that in a proper case, where 
bill of particulars is permitted, the bill limits or 
enlarges the issues of proof." 
Under our present lTtah Rules of Civil Procedure in 
absence of the use of a bill of particulars, provision is 
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made for other types of discovery among them being, 
Interrogatories to Parties as provided by rule 33 Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The last paragraph of rule 33 
provides in part as follows: 
''Interrogatories may relate to any matters 
which can be inquired into under Rule 26 (b), and 
the answers may be used to the same extent as 
provided in Rule 26 (d) for the use of the deposi-
tion of a party. Interrogatories may be served 
after a deposition has been taken, and a deposi-
tion may be sought after interrogatories have been 
answered, but the court, on motion of the depo-
nent or the party interrogated, may make such 
protective order as justice may require." 
Rule 26 (d) paragraphs 1 and 2 provide as follows: 
"'(1) Any deposition may be used by any 
party for the purpose of contradicting or impeach-
ing the testimony of deponent as a witness. 
(2) The deposition of a party or of any 
one who at the time of taking the deposition was 
an officer, director, or managing agent of a public 
or private corporation, partnership, or associa-
tion which is a party may be used by an adverse 
party for any purpose." 
It clearly appears from the wording of rnle 26 (d) 
that the Interrogatories to Parties may be used upon the 
hearing of a motion, and that the deposition of a party 
may be used by an adverse party for any purpose. 
Since a bill of Particulars was not denominated by 
the Code of Civil Procedure as being a pleading but was 
by decision of .this court declared to be a pleading when 
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relating to an issue raised by a eontplaint, ans\ver or 
counterclaim, and since the use of interrogatories per-
forins a function under the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure comparable to the functions of a bill of particulars 
under the code of Civil Procedure, then even though the 
litah R,ules of Civil Procedure do not specifically denomi-
nate Interrogatories to Parties and~e. answers thereto 
as being pleadings, yet the same should be so considered 
\Yhenever the answers to interrogatories relate to an 
issue raised by a complaint, answer or counterclaim. 
At the bottom of Page 7 of Appell~nt's brief, appel-
lant contends that if answers to interrogatories are con-
sidered pleadings, then it would be impossible to 1nake a 
~Iotion for Judgment on the Pleadings because the plead-
ings 'vould never be closed. Of course, technically, plead-
ings are not closed until the time of trial since it is pos-
sible to amend the various pleadings, but there being no 
n1otions.to amend, pending., for all practical purposes and 
for purposes of Motion for Judgment On The Pleadings, 
the pleadings are closed. Likewise, though the Appellant 
1night have interposed interrogatories to be answered by 
the Respondent, yet there having been no interrogatories 
pending, unanswered, at the time of Motion For J udg-
ment On The Pleadings, the pleadings were closed. 
The complaint of the Appellant substantially fol-
lowed Form 16 of forms set out in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and alleged in paragraph 1 of the com-
plaint (R. 1) : 
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"1. Plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the 
possession of the following described personal 
property located in Bountiful, Utah: A 1952 
~1:ercury four-door sedan, Motor No. 52 LA-27, 
188-M.'' 
J>aragraph 2 of the complaint alleges possession in the 
respondent, paragravh 3 alleges a demand for possession 
and refusal, and paragraph 4 alleges damages. 
rrhe action COlninenced by the Appellant was solely 
one of replevin. Replevin is defined in Corpus Juris 
~ecundum, Volume 77, Page 10 as being an action at law 
for the recovery of specific personal chattels, wrongfully 
taken and detained or wrongfully detained. At page 13 
of said Volwne 77, it is stated that replevin is a posses-
sory action in which the gist of the action is the plaintiffs 
right to in1mediate possession of the property and the 
defendant's wrongful taking or wrongful detention of 
the property. Again at page 29 of Volume 77, Corpus 
Juris Secundum, it is stated that since replevin is strictly 
a possessory action, it lies only in behalf of one entitled 
to immediate, exclusive and unqualified possession as 
against the defendant at the time of commencing the 
action, and if there is any preliminary act or condition 
precedent to be perfor1ned before the unqualified right 
of possession attaches, the action cannot be maintained. 
The complaint alleges as a conclusion that the plain-
tiff is the owner and entitled to immediate possession of 
the automobile. In answer to interrogatory 1, appellant 
answers that it is a lien holder by virtue of a conditional 
sales contract which had been assigned to appellant by 
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Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., and that appellant had 
never ta.ken possession of the car, thus contradicting, or 
at least qualifying, the allegations of the complaint. As 
a conditional seller, the appellant had no right of posses-
sion except upon default under the contract, but the 
appellant did not allege a contract or the default there-
of, or any other allegations supporting the ap·pellant's 
right to immediate possession. In answer to Inter-
rogatory No. 10, the appellant states that Edw. S . 
. Barrett and/or Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., owed 
appellant some conditional obligations but that only one 
debt of $528.00 was liquidated. In answer to Interroga-
tory No. 11, appellant admits that no action was taken 
against Edw. S. Barrett and/or Motor Center of Poca-
tello, Inc., within four months prior to December 13, 
1952, which indicates that no action was taken after 
Septe1nber 9, 1952, the date which appellant claims to 
have acquired an interest in the car. In its affidavit of 
Replevin (R. 19), appellant deposes upon information 
and belief that Respondent claimed to have purchased 
the car from Edward S. Barrett. The appellant could 
not have maintained replevin against Edward S. Barrett 
and/or Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., without alleging 
and proving a default under the contract. In the case of 
Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co., et al., 106 Utah 166, 146 
P2d 284, in which Calhoun purchased a car from a dealer ~ 
the dealer assigned the contract to Universal Credit Co., 
who repossessed the car without knowledge or consent 
of Calhoun after Calhoun was in default of payments 
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under the contract. There was evidence that Calhoun 
had been given extensions on previous instaln1ents. Cal-
houn brought action for conversion recovered judgment 
' in the trial court. which was affirmed by the Supreme 
(~ourt holding at Page 17 4: 
''Thus until notice of intention to enforce the 
forfeiture provisions of a contract was given, and 
a reasonable tiine to comply with the demand for 
payment allowed, an indefinite extension of tin1e 
would not expire, and defendants could not repos-
sess the automobile." 
The Appellant contends (App. Br. 25) that it was 
entitled to bring replevin and cited Morgan vs. Layton, 
GO Utah 280, 208 Pac. 505; however that case was one in 
'vhich the complaint alleged the 1nortgage, the default 
thereof and the provisions which entitled the Plaintiff to 
possession, and the Supreme Court held further in that 
case: 
"The possession acquired by the Plaintiff 
under judgment of the court, however, is not an 
absolute, unqualified possession. It is li1nited by 
the purposes for which it was obtained, viz., in 
order to foreclose the mortgage by advertise1nent 
and sale as provided by law. For that purpose, 
and that purpose only, the Plaintiff is entitled to 
possession of the property." 
The Appellant in answer to the interrogatories 
admitted . that it had never had possession of the car, 
that no action has been commenced against Motor Center 
of Pocatello, Inc., andjor Edward s .. Barrett, that no 
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payYnents had been made upon the liquidated debt and 
no definite ruuount had been estimated on the conditional 
debts, and that there were no liquidated debts owing 
from Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., and/or Edward S. 
Barrett except a debt of $528.00 arising on July 17, 19-53, 
all of which clearly indicates that no procedure declaring 
forfeiture under the conditional sales contract had been 
taken; and that Appellant could not have been the "o,vner 
and entitled to possession" of the car. 
The Idaho Code 49-401 (e) entitled "Definitions" 
provides: 
49 Idaho Code 401 "D·efinitions'' 
" (e) Owner-A person who holds the legal 
title to vehicle or in the event vehicle is the sub-
ject of an agreement for the conditional sale or 
lease thereof With the right of purchase upon per-
formance of the condition stated in agreement 
with an immediate right of possession vested in 
the conditional vendee or lessee or in the event a 
mortgagor of vehicle is entitled to possession, then 
such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor 
shall be deemed the owner for purposes of this 
chapter." 
Idaho Code 49-416 further provides: 
"In the event of the transfer of ownership of 
a motor vehicle by operation of law as upon 
inheritance . . . . . or repossession is had upon 
default in perfor1nance of the terms of a condi-
tional sales contract ..... the department of la'v 
enforcement may upon the surrender of the prior 
certificate of title, or when that is not possible, 
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upon presentation of satisfactory proof to the 
department of ownership and right to possession 
of such motor vehicle and presentation of an 
application for a certificate of title, issue to the 
applicant a certificate of title thereto. Only an 
affidavit by the person or agent of the person to 
whotn possession of the rnotor vehicle so passed, 
~etting forth facts entitling him to such posses-
sion and ownership, together with a copy of the 
journal entry, court order or instrument upon 
which such clairn of possession and ownership is 
founded, shall be considered satisfactory proof 
of ownership and right of possession. If the 
applicant cannot produce such proof of ownership 
he may apply directly to the department of law 
enforcement and sub1nit such evidence as he may 
have and the department of law enforcement may 
thereupon, if it finds the evidence sufficient, issue 
a certificate of title to the applicant." · 
The Appellant contends that it was entitled to pro-
duce facts as set forth on Page 14 of its brief, assuming 
that the court was proceeding under the Summary Judg-
Inent procedure. However, the court did not consider 
1natters outside of the pleadings and the Summary Judg-
lnent procedure was not applicable. Nevertheless, even 
though the facts which appellant sets forth on page 14 
of its brief were admitted, these facts ta~en with the 
answers to interrogatories would show nothing more 
than a lienholder's interest in the appellant and would 
not avail the appellant under its allegations in replevin 
\Vh'ich appears to be a mistaken remedy in absence of 
allegations in the complaint in addition to the conclusion 
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that plaintiff is "owner and entitle·d to possession" of 
the car. The appellant n1a.de no attempt to amend the 
con1plaint. 
POINT II 
WHETHER FROM THE PLEADINGS THE RESPOND-
ENT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT UPON THE 
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE RESPONDENT. 
The Respondent's counterclaim, (supra page 7) 
seeks equitable relief by way of quieting title to the ear 
in the Respondent as against the appellant. The success 
of the counterclain1 depends upon the proof of a purchase 
or acquisition by the Respondent under circumstance 
which would constitute the claim of the Respondent 
superior to and prior in right to that of the appellant. 
The trial court could prop·erly find such proof in the 
pleadings from the following pleadings.: 
(a) The Affidavit of Replevin (R. 19) of the appel-
lant alleges under oath, that "affiant is informed and 
believes and therefore alleges, that the defendant clain1s 
to have purchased the property from one Edward R. , 
. Barrett but Affiant further alleges that said Edward 
S. Barrett does not have title nor right to possession to 
said automobile." 
From this affidavit Appellant admits the existence 
of the claim of Respondent to have purchased the car 
from Edward S. Barrett; the allegation that Edward f<. 
Barrett "does not have title nor right to possession to 
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:"aid automobile'' is not an allegation that Edward S. 
llarrett did not have title and right to possession at the 
t i IllP of sale and transfer of possession to Respondent. 
(b) By the answer to Interrogatory No. 1, Appel-
lant answers that it is a lienholder under a conditional 
~ales contract an'd that Appellant had never taken pos-
~ession of the automobile. 
(c) Answering interrogatories Numbers 3, 4, 5, and 
n, the appellant answers that during the past two years 
_t\.ppellant had been financing motor vehicles, flooring 
automobiles and supplying other types of financing for 
Edward S. Barrett and Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc. 
(d) R.espondent by interrogatory No. 7 requested 
the Appellant to list the date, amounts advanced, and 
the description of any auton1obiles financed by the Appel-
lant for Edward S. Barrett and/or ~fotor Center of 
l_)ocatello, Inc., during the past two years. The Appel-
lant answered : 
"A full and complete answer to this inter-
rogatory would require a complete audit of the 
Edward S. Barrett and Motor Center of Pocatello, 
Inc. acounts extending over the full period of two 
years and would be burdensome upon the Plain-
tiff. Innumerable transactions have occured dur-
ing the last two years and the ferreting out of 
each one would amount to a Herculean task. 
Again by interrogatory No. 9 the Respondent re-
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quested Appellant to state the na1ne~ and address0s of 
any persons who purchased any auton1obiles fro1n 
Edward S. Barrett and/or 1\tiotor Center of PoeatPllo, 
Inc., \vhich had been financed by the Appellant during 
the pa:St two years. In response the Appellant gavP 
ans\Yer the same as its ans,ver to Interrogatory No. 7. 
(e) Answering Interrogatory No. 10 Appellant 
stated that the exact an1ount of the debt was unknown; 
that only one debt of $528.00 "~as liquidated and was 
i..11curred July 17, 1955 ( 1953). 
(f) Answering Interrogatory No. 11 Appellant 
admitted that no action whatsoever had been taken 
against Edward S. Barrett or Motor Center of Poca-
tello, Inc. 
From the foregoing it \vould appear that the n1ost 
the Appellant could offer by way of proof is that it held 
a lien by reason of a conditional sales contract; that a 
certificate of title showed Appellant as lienholder; that 
.:\ppellant had for more than two years been financing 
automobiles under various plans for E'dward S. Barrett 
and ].Iotor Center of Pocatello, Inc., to the extent that to 
enumerate the transactions would constitute a "Hercu-
lean task". 
This would resolve the issue as to \vhether one who 
finances a dealer in new automobiles, flooring plans, 
demonstrators and various other types of financing, can 
claim priority by reason of a reeorded lien as against 
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one who purchases the automobile from the dealer but 
l'a'ils to obtain a certificate of title at the time of 
}>Urchas<l. 
rrhe Appellant urges that the Respondent could not 
acquire any interest in the automobile without first hav-
ing issued to him a certificate of title, and cites both the 
ldaho Code and the Case of L'UX vs. Lockridge, 65 Idaho 
G39, 150 p. (2d) 127 (App. Br. 23), in support of this 
argument. Lu.x vs. Lockridge did not hold that there 
could be no sale without a transfer of title, but held that 
one could not be a bona fide purchaser under circum-
~tances of that case without first receiving a certificate 
of title. 
The case of Swartz vs. White, 80 U 150, 13 p (2d) 
(i43, cited by the Idaho Court 'vas one wherein a ~Irs. 
'Vhite owned a car and endorsed certificate of title there-
to in blank and left it at her home. Stewart made a false 
representation to Mrs. White's husband and obtained the 
eertificate and possession of the car. The car was worth 
about $400.00. Stewart filled in his name in the blank 
in the presence of Swartz and received $125.00 from 
Swartz and delivered the certificate to Swartz. Swartz 
brings replevin claiming to be an innocent purchaser. On 
appeal the Supreme Court held that in view of the notice 
to Swartz of the delivery of the title in blank and the 
. ' 
requirements of the statute regarding receipt of a certifi-
cate of title before title passes, and the fact that Swartz 
\Vas only going to pay $125.00 for an auto worth at least 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
twice that figure, Swartz could not have been a bona fidu 
purchaser. At page 158, the Court held: 
"Without attempting to decide the complete 
meaning or full operation of this provision of the 
statute (registration), it is sufficient to say that 
the circumstances in this case, in view of that 
statute, amount to a flag of warning to any intend-
ing purchaser that there has been no completed 
sale or transfer of title by the registered owner. 
Swartz was thereby put on inquiry as to the 
responsibility of Stewart and his right to dispose 
of or pledge the car. By the possession which he 
had Stewart could have been a buyer, or bailee, 
or an agent with limited power to sell, or he could 
have been as he was, in possession . by larceny 
without any right whatsoever to transfer title." 
The reference of the Utah Court to the registration 
statute was not essential to support the decision of the 
court, since the decision is supported by considerable 
other evidence that s.wartz was not a bona fide purchaser. 
The dissent opinion in Lux vs. Lockridge wherein 
two of the five justices dissented contended that the 
statute under consideration was never intended to have 
application to the immediate parties, i.e., vendor and 
vendee, but that the statute is clearly an Anti-·Theft Act. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in cases subsequent to 
Swartz vs. White, (supra) hold that equitable title to a 
motor vehicle can be transferred without transfer and 
issuance of a certificate of title. 
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In the Case of Dahl vs. Prilnce, 230 p (2d) 328, ..... . 
U ------ (1951), the plaintiff, auto dealer, took a Buick 
auto1nohile in trade from one, Garn, but did not have the 
certificate of title transferred to him at the Tax commis-
sion. A creditor of Gam attached the Buick while Garn 
had it one day using it while Plaintiff repaired Garn's 
truek. Plaintiff brings replevin against the Sheriff, 
Prince. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by the 
Supre1ne Court which held that the plaintiff could 
a<'quire equitable title without getting a new certificate 
as required by 57-3a-72, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. The 
court quoted from its previous holding in Jackson vs. 
James, 97 U. 41, 89 P. (2d) 235, to the effect that a gift of 
ownership to an automobile would be complete as be-
tween the donor and donee without change in registra-
tion, and that the statute makes the registration evidence 
of title and ownership for the protection of innocent 
fide purchaser. 
The Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of 
the purchaser from a dealer as against a finance com-
pany in Jones vs. Commercial Investment Trust, 65 U 
151, 228 Pac. 896, wherein the Plaintiff purchased an 
automobile from a dealer who was being financed by the 
Defendant. Judgment for the Plaintiff was affirmed by 
the court holding that the Defendant finance company 
retaining legal title to the automobile but allowing a 
dealer to exhibit the same and hold itself out as legal 
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owner, with right to sell the same, is estopped to deny 
the authority of the dealer to sell the vehicle to a bona 
purchasers. 
Again in the Case of Harrison vs . .Auto Securities 
Co. et al., 70 U 11, 257 P 677, the Plaintiff purchased a 
car in Price, Utah, from a dealer who had received it 
from a Salt Lake dealer. The Salt Lake dealer was being 
financed by the Defendant and the latter repossessed the 
car by trick. Plaintiff sued for conversion and judgment 
for the Plaintiff is affirmed on appeal, the Court hold-
ing that the Defendant was estopped and that where one 
of two innocent parties must suffer from the wrongful 
act of a third person, the·loss shall fall upon the one who 
by his conduct created the circumstances which enabled 
the third party to perpetrate the wrong and cause the 
loss. 
Appellant cites Idaho Code 49-404 (App. Br. 23) 
contending that no interest to a motor vehicle can be 
acquired without the issuance of a certificate of ti tie. 
Ho,vever, this provision was not intended to ap·ply to a 
dealer in Motor vehicles in transactions with another 
dealer. The following provisions of the Idaho Code 
should be considered 
Idaho Code 49-130 (c) "Provided further a 
registered dealer in motor vehicles shall not be 
permitted to license his individual cars which are 
being held for the purpose of being sold to the 
public." 
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Idaho Code 49-402 APPLICATION TO 
CERT'AIN VEHICLES-EXEMPTIONS. "The 
provisions of this chaper shall apply exclusively 
to ·every motor vehicle required to be registered 
with the department under the laws of this state 
except any said vehicles owned by the federal 
government excepting also vehicles exeinpt under 
provision of section 49-108." (Farm equipment, 
etc.). 
49-403 Idaho Code DELIVERY OE_, CER-
TIFICATEOFTITLE UPON SALE OR DISPO-
SITION - RE-ASSIGNMENT BY DEALERS. 
"No person shall hereafter sell or otherwise dj~­
pose of a motor vehicle without delivery to the 
purchaser or transferee thereof a certificate of 
title with such assignment thereon as may be 
necessary to show title in the purchaser .... pro-
vided that any dealer holding current dealer 
license plates issued by this state, in lieu of hav-
ing a certificate of title issued in the name of such 
dealer, reassign any existing certificate of title 
issued in this state. 
49-405 Idaho Code .... If a certificate of title 
has not previously been issued for such motor 
vehicle in this state, said application, unless other-
wise provided for in this chapter, shall be accom-
panied by a proper bill of sale or a dully certified 
copy thereof, or by a certificate of title bill of 
sale or other evidence of ownership req~ired by 
law of any other state from which such motor 
vehicle was brought into this state. 
In the case of a new motor vehicle being 
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registered for the first time, no certificate or 
title or registration shall be issued unless such 
application is endorsed by an enfranchised ne'v 
car dealer authorized to sell such new motor 
vehicle. The department of law enforcement shall 
retain the evidence of title presented by the appli-
cant and on which the certificate of title is 
issued .... 
49-421 Whoever shall . . . . operate in this 
state a motor vehicle for which a certificate of 
title is required, without such certificate having 
been obtained in accordance with the provisions 
of this chapter .... or whoever, not being an 
enfranchised dealer, or acting upon behalf of such 
dealer, shall acquire, purchase hold or display for 
sale a new motor vehicle without having obtained 
a certificate or title therefor is guilty of a Inisdc-
meanor. 
It will be noted that 49-130 (c) prohibits a dealer 
from licensing his individual cars which are being held 
for sale and that 49-402 indicates that the provisions of 
the code cited by the Appellant do not apply to vehicles 
not required to be registered. 
By 49-403 it appears that a dealer acquires title and 
can. transfer title without having a certificate issued in 
his name. Also 49-405 provides that a dealer acquires 
title to a new vehicle by a proper bill of sale. The pro-
visions of 49-421 indicate that a dealer or one acting upon 
behalf of such dealer can display for sale a new motor 
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\'ehicle \Vi thout obtaining certificate of title thereto. To 
~upport the contention that the vehicle was deemed new, 
\\'P (~i te Idaho Code 49-401 (c) : 
h 'Used \r ehicle' every motor vehicle, which 
has been sold, bargained, exchanged, given away 
or title transferred from the person who first 
ae( tuired it from the manufacturing or importer, 
dealer or agent of the manufacturer or importer, 
and so used as to have become what is commonly 
kno\\·n as 'second-hand' within the ordinary mean-
ing thereof." 
From an analysis of the Idaho Code it appears that 
the provi8ions relied upon by the Appellant are not 
applicable to dealers acquiring automobiles fro1n dealers 
or others. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is respectfully submitted that the pleadings clearly 
tlstablish that Appellant had no standing upon its com-
plaint in replevin, and that the Decree quieting title to 
·lhe vehicle in the Respondent was fully supported and 
justified. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE K. FADEL 
Counsel for Respondent 
Bountiful, Utah 
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